Previous meditations on humility can be found here, here, and here.

If you want to get technical about it, things like LaVeyan Satanism can arguably be said to reject the notion of humility, at least implicitly. In LaVey’s interpretation of Satanism, the self is God, which is a profoundly un-humble position to adopt. That said, some of the other principles of the belief, as articulated by LaVey, implicitly extol and praise humble actions, the rejection of solipsism being one example.

If you want to find a philosophical system that rejects humility outright, you need to look at Ayn Rand’s Objectivism:

Self-abasement is the antithesis of morality. If a man has acted immorally, but regrets it and wants to atone for it, it is not self-abasement that prompts him, but some remnant of love for moral values—and it is not self-abasement that he expresses, but a longing to regain his self-esteem. Humility is not a recognition of one’s failings, but a rejection of morality. “I am no good” is a statement that may be uttered only in the past tense. To say: “I am no good” is to declare: “– and I never intend to be any better.”

You can also find this same attitude on Galt’s speech:

Discard the protective rags of that vice which you call a virtue: humility — learn to value yourself, which means: to fight for your happiness—and when you learn that pride is the sum of all virtues, you will learn to live like a man.

I have argued in the past that even the Eight Virtues really cannot be thought of as existing with only one anti-Virtue each, and that each of the Virtues exists as a golden mean between two opposing anti-Virtues. Granted, that isn’t how they have been presented in the Ultima games, but if we think about the matter even a little, it’s not hard to tease out the second anti-Virtue. Valor, for example, is traditionally opposed by Cowardice, but it is arguably also opposed by Recklessness. Compassion is opposed by the act and attitude of Despising, but is arguably also opposed by Enabling. And so it goes for the remaining six Virtues.

The key point to note is that in each case, the second anti-Virtue looks (at least from an outside, casual vantage point) looks somewhat like the Virtue it actually opposes. Enabling is an easy example here (it can also be called “false compassion”), because both inwardly and outwardly, it and genuine Compassion arise from similar impulses. But whereas genuine Compassion is a love for others that raises them above their present station (or at least does not worsen it), Enabling is that which outwardly seems like a loving action directed toward another…but ultimately makes their situation worse.

Humility, of course, is opposed by Pride within the Ultima canon, but it is arguably also opposed by the thing that Rand actually rails against: Humiliation. And it’s important to note the distinction between the two. For whereas Humility is the grounded sense of one’s self-worth and one’s own capabilities tempered by a proper understanding of one’s place in the order of nature and creation, Humiliation involves the (voluntary or involuntary) abasement of the self, a deliberate but artificial lowering of one’s intrinsic worth and a denial of one’s capabilities. Far from being tempered by a proper understanding of one’s place in the order of nature and creation, Humiliation deliberately lowers the self below its proper station and capabilities.

Humility, then, is arguably a form of strength of character, whereas humiliation is arguably a deficiency of character. And Rand, it would seem, confuses the two, dismissing humility in general as merely an applied form of humiliation. Her error, ultimately, is categorical. It’s almost tragic, since she otherwise extols many of the positive fruits of the virtue, albeit confusing these with the fruits of pride.